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A call to resist illegitimate authority

Interventionin Vietnam and
Central America: Parallels and
Differences
NOAM CHOMSKY
The foil owing is Part I (Part II will
run in the next issue) of an edited version of a talk given at Harvard University on March 19, 1985, by Noam
Chomsky, a member of the board of
Resist.
The speech was transcribed and produced by members and friends of the
Harvard/ Radcliffe Committee on Central America and the Central America
Solidarity Association. Those interested in obtaining the full text of the
speech (18 pages single-spaced) can
contact the Resist office.
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the real world, U.S. global planning has always been sophisticated and
careful, as you'd expect from a major
superpower with a highly centralized
and class conscious dominant social
group. Their power, in turn is rooted in
their own ownership and management
of the society and economy, as is the
norm in most societies. During World
War II, American planners were very
well aware that the United States was
going to emerge as a world-dominant
power in a position of hegemony that
had few historical parallels and they
organized and met in order to deal with
this situation.

From 1939 to 1945, extensive studies
were conducted by the Council on
Foreign Relations and the State
Department. One group was called the
War-Peace Studies Group, which met
for six years and produced extensive
geopolitical analyses and plans. The
Council on Foreign Relations is essentially the business input to foreign
policy planning. These groups also involved every top planner in the State
Department with the exception of the
Secretary of State.
The conception that they developed
is what they called "Grand Area"
planning. The Grand Area was to be a
region that was subordinated to the
needs of the American economy. As
one planner put it, it was to be the
region that is ''strategically necessary
for world control." The geopolitical
analysis held that the Grand Area had
to include at least the Western
Hemisphere, the Far East and the
former British Empire, which we were
then in the process of dismantling and
taking over ourselves. This is what is
called "anti-imperialism" in American
scholarship. The Area was also to include western and southern Europe
and the oil-producing regions of the
Middle East, and in fact, it was to include everything, if that were possible.
Detailed plans were laid for particular
regions of the Grand Area and also for

international institutions that were to
organize and police it, essentially in the
interests of this subordination to
American domestic needs.
With respect to the Far East, the
plans were roughly as follows: Japan,
it was understood, would sooner or
later be the industrial heartland of Asia
once again. Since Japan is a resourcepoor area, it would need Southeast
Asia and South Asia for resources and
markets. All of this, of course, would
be incorporated with the global system
dominated by the United States.
With regard to Latin America, the
matter was put most plainly by
Secretary of War Henry Stimson in
May 1945 when he was explaining how
we must eliminate and dismantle all
regional systems dominated by any
other power, particularly the British,
while maintaining and extending our
own system. He explained with regard
to Latin America as follows: "I think
that it's not asking too much to have
our little region over here which never
has bothered anybody."
The basic thinking behind all this has
been explained quite lucidly on a
number of occasions. (This is a very
open society and if one wants to learn
what's going on, you can do it; it takes
a little work, but the documents are

Continued on page Two
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there and the history is there also.) One
of the clearest and most lucid accounts
of the planning behind this was by
George Kennan, who was one of the
most thoughtful, humane, and liberal
of the planners, and, in fact, was
eliminated from the State Department
largely for that reason. Kennan was the
head of the State Department Policy
Planning Staff in the late 1940's. In the
following document, PPS23, February
1948, he outlined the basic planning:
"We have aboQt 50 percent of the
world's wealth , but only 6.3 percent
of its population. In this situation,
we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real test in
the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of
disparity. We need not deceive
ourselves that we can afford today
the luxury of altruism and worldbenefaction ....
We should cease to
talk about vague and ... unreal objectives such as human rights, the
raising of the living standards, and
democratization. The day is not far
off when we are going to have to deal
in straight power concepts. The less
we are hampered by idealistic
slogans, the better."

There are some questions that one
can raise about Kennan's formulation,
a number of them, but I'll keep to one.
One is whether he is right in suggesting
that "human rights, the raising of the
living standards, and democratization'' should be dismissed as irrelevant
to American foreign policy. Actually, a
review of the historical record suggests
a different picture, namely that the
United States often has opposed with
tremendous ferocity, and violence,
these elements -human
rights,
democratization, and the raising of living standards.
This is particularly the case in Latin
America and there are very good
reasons for it. The commitment of
these doctrines is inconsistent with the
use of harsh measures to maintain the
disparity, to insure our control over 50
percent of the resources, and our exploitation of the world. In short, what
we might call ''the First Freedom''
(there were Four Freedoms, you
remember, but there was one that was
left out), the Freedom to Rob, and
that's really the only one that counts;
the others were mostly for show. And
in order to maintain the freedom to rob
and exploit, we do have to consistently
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oppose democratization, the raising of
living standards, and human rights.
And we do consistently oppose them;
that, of course is in the real world.
This Top Secret document referred
to the Far East, but Kennan applied the
same ideas to Latin America in a briefing for Latin American ambassadors in
which he explained that: ''One of the
main concerns of U.S. policy is the
protection of our raw materials.'' Who
must we protect our raw materials
from? Well, primarily, the domestic
populations, the indigenous populations, which may have ideas about raising living standards. And that's inconsistent with maintaining the disparity.
How will we protect our raw materials
from the indigenous population? Well,
the answer is the following:
"The final answer might be an
unpleasant one, but . . . we should
not hesitate before police repression
by the local government. This is not
shameful, since the Communists are
essentially traitors ....
It is better to
have a strong regime in power than a
liberal government if it is indulgent
and relaxed and penetrated by Communists.""

Well, who are the Communists?
''Communists''
is a term regularly
used in American political theology to
ref er to people who are committed to
the belief that ''the government has
direct responsibility for the welfare of
the people." I'm quoting the words of
a 1949 State Department intelligence
report which warned about the spread
of this grim and evil doctrine, which
does, of course, threaten "our raw
materials"
if we can't abort it
somehow.
In the mid-1950's, these ideas were
developed further. For example, one
interesting case was an important study
by a prestigious study group headed by
William Yandell Eliot, who was the
Williams Professor of Government at
Harvard. They were also concerned
with what Communism is and how it
spreads. They concluded accurately
that the primary threat of Communism
is the economic transformation of the
Communist powers "in ways which
reduce their willingness and ability to
complement the industrial economies
of the West." That is essentially correct and is a good operational definition of "Communism" in American
political discourse. Our government is
committed to that view.
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If a government is so evil or otherwise as to undertake a course of action
of this sort, it immediately becomes an
enemy. It becomes a part of the
''monolithic and ruthless conspiracy''
to take over the world, as John F. Kennedy put it. It is postulated that they
have been taken over by the Russians if
that's the policy that they appear to be
committed to.
On these grounds, American policy
towards Nicaragua after the 1979
revolution could have been predicted
by simply observing that the health and
education budget of Nicaragua rose
rapidly, that an effective land reform
program was instituted, and that the
infant mortality rate dropped very
dramatically, to the point where
Nicaragua won an award from the
World Health Organization for health
achievements (all of this despite horrifying conditions left by the Somoza
dictatorship which we had installed
and supported, and continued to support to the very end, despite a lot of
nonsense to the contrary that one
hears.) If a country is devoted to
policies like I've just described it is obviously the enemy. It is part of "the
monolithic and ruthless conspiracy'' the Russians are taking it over. And, in
fact, it is part of a conspiracy. It is part
of a conspiracy to take from us what is

Continued on page Seven
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Reform, Resistance and Reaction in
South Africa
DAVID L. GOODMAN

There

is a tendency by many people to view the unrest taking place right
now in South Africa as part of a
monolithic pattern of continued
violence in that country. But this is not
the case in 1985. There has been a major escalation of grassroots protest in
South Africa since September 1984,
and this has been to a large extent the
result of an increasingly politicized
population.
Two major incidents that have taken
place this year, namely the massacre on
the anniversary of the Sharpeville killings and the riots that took place in the
Crossroads squatter camps in February, dramatize this new politicization.
In February, police armored personnel carriers moved in on the sprawling
Crossroads squatter camp near Cape
Town. Crossroads is home to over
100,000 people, the majority of whom
live there illegally as a result of ''influx
control" laws which prohibit blacks
from living in or near the all white
preserves of Cape Town. Police were
coming to Crossroads to begin one of
Pretoria's
most ambitious-and
vicious-forced removal programs to
date. White authorities are preparing
to force a quarter of a million black
South Africans to a new city that has
recently been completed on a sand
wasteland 16 miles from Cape Town,
called Kayalitscha. But the squatter
camp residents began preparing back
in the early fall for these removals. The
Crossroads executive committee was
meeting regularly to map strategy to
mobilize people against the removals.
The KTC squatter camp was holding
regular Sunday meetings in preparation for when the state escalated its
campaign.
And in February, the battles began.
Rumor had spread in the squatter
camps that police were about to move
in to begin the removals. The squatters
mobilized quickly. Pre-arranged choke
points inside Crossroads were closed,
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and piles of trash were placed
strategically to prevent police vehicles
from passing. The South African
Police (SAP) responded in the way
people have become accustomed to, by
opening fire on the defiant squatters.
The confrontation left 18 dead and
hundreds wounded. It also forced the
South African Minister of Cooperation
and Development, Gerrit Viljoen, to
declare a temporary truce and suspend
the removals.
What followed in March was a surprise even to seasoned opponents of
the apartheid regime. Winnie Mandela,
appearing on ABC's Night line show,
predicted that the state would not be so
stupid as to provoke -an incident on the
anniversary
of the Sharpeville
massacre. But on March 21, 25 years to
the day after 69 unarmed people protesting the same pass law system were
gunned down by the SAP, another 21
people (an official figure which
residents say represents less than half
the real figure) were murdered by
police near the major industrial center
of Port Elizabeth.
The massacre in March was preceded
by the second major general strike to
hit South Africa in five months. On
November 5 and 6, the Transvaal
region of South Africa, which includes
Resist Newsletter

the industrial centers of Johannesburg
and Pretoria, was paralyzed by a
general strike called to protest the
detentions of black political leaders
and the repression in the townships. In
March, the Port Elizabeth factories,
including those of Ford and General
Motors, ground to a halt when black
workers went on strike. Authorities
tried to force people back to work, but
to no avail. The strike was at a peak
when the SAP opened fire on a funeral
procession on March 21. The response
of the police must be seen partly as a
panicked response by the state, an act
of desperation when the most effective
weapon in the hands of South African
blacks, their labor, was being used with
considerable success.
The wave of protests going on in
South Africa now began in earnest in
September 1984. There were a number
of events that occurred in South Africa
to spark those protests, the largest and
most widespread since the Soweto
uprising of 1976. But as the Rev. Frank
Chikane, a member of the UDF's
(United Democratic Front) national executive who will soon go on trial for
high treason, was quick to point out,
"The present situation is different.
Protest can't be mopped up like in
1976. You are dealing with people with
a political consciousness now.''
The major causes of urban unrest
that began eight months ago have been
the opposition in the townships to two
new disguises of apartheid policy that
came into being in the past year: black
local government and the new constitution.
The Black Local Authorities (BLA)
Act of 1982 directed that the residents
of an urban black township could vote
for members of a local town or city
council. This council is charged with
providing and maintaining basic services such as water and electricity, road
building and trash removal. They have
also been given control of the police
force and responsibility for enforcing
pass laws.
Continued on page Four
Page Three

South Africa
Continued from page Three
But the councils have not been given
any money with which to operate, so
they must function solely on income
received from sales of alcohol, fines,
property levies and utility service
charges. House rents are paid to a different government agency.
In practice, 70 percent of the income
of the administration boards (the
forerunner of the town councils) was
derived from the sales of alcohol in
1980-81. The town councils are further
starved for money as a result of a law
passed in the early '70's that declared a
township such as Soweto, lying outside
of Johannesburg, was thereafter "autonomous." This was a euphemism for
saying that it was financially cut off
from a wealthy urban center and would
receive none of the taxes paid by the
large corporations
and wealthy
residents of the cities.
The new black town councils are
politically impotent, ultimately being
under the control of the Minister of
Cooperation and Development (formerly the Minister of Bantu Affairs).
This branch of government administers
most of the apartheid laws that affect
black people, from bantu education to
forced removals. The government
claimed, however, that the act would
provide Africans with a bigger say in
the running of their townships. But the
government's real intention was captured in a newspaper editorial that
stated: "the rule is simple: Africans
must pay for their own houses and services. If they can't afford it, they must
go and live in the homelands."
Elections for the new town councils
were held in November and December
1982. Community leaders, led by the
UDF, called for a boycott of the elections. They claimed that the new councilors would be government puppets.
The election results surprised even
supporters of the plan in Pretoria.
Black turnout for the BLA elections
was less than 21 percent nationwide.
The UDF charged that the numbers
were inflated and that actual turnout
was less than 10 percent. One example
of black sentiment toward the election
was demonstrated in the township of
Evaton. Of the 33,000 adults living
there, only 535 people voted in the
council elections. Black township
residents let it be known that they
would not be duped so easily by the
facade of reform.
As always, the promise of big
Page Four

paychecks, houses and political power
provided the policy's architects with
the black councilors they needed to do
Pretoria's work (and the Minister of
Cooperation and Development was
authorized to appoint councilors in
case none were elected.)
The social and economic position of
the new councils fits in with President
Botha's plan to develop a pool of
black, middle-class bureaucrats who
can both represent Pretoria's interests
and stand as a buff er between the
government and .the masses of poor,
discontented blacks. But more important, it is these black puppet leaders,
such as the heads of the bantustans,
whom Pretoria points to as the ''true
leaders" of the black people. It is with
these leaders that Pretoria will
negotiate the future of South Africa's
23 million blacks.
As Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heuin put
it, "By leaders, I don't imply that we
have only to consult with the leaders of
the national independent states, but
also with identified urban leaders,
especially those who seek solutions on
a constitutional and peaceful basis ....
We will not talk to people that opt for
revolutionary or forcible changes in
this country.'' Both Pretoria and
Washington can point to "negotiations'' and ''open discussions'' that are
taking place with South Africa's black
"leaders," thus preserving the facade
of progress while further entrenching
the reality of apartheid.
In the past 10 months, township
residents have been proven correct in
their predictions about the new councils. The new councillors have quickly
set about raising property rents and
levying surcharges in a desperate attempt
to keep themselves and their townships
solvent.
In the Transvaal township of Daveytown, rents were raised by 200
percent. The Soweto City Council increased water tariffs by $2.15, and
levied an electricity surcharge of $12
per household - even for households
that had no electricity.
Then in October of this year, the
Soweto city council voted to provide a
plot of land for Soweto "mayor"
Ephraim Tshabalala that would accommodate his plans for a two-story
house, tennis courts, meeting rooms
and swimming pool. Despite the fact
that the wait for housing in the over-
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crowded township is often longer than
five years, the Council approved a
residential plot that is big enough to
hold 50 houses.
The people have responded angrily
to this new form of government control. On September 3rd residents of the
townships of the so-called Vaal
Triangle, an area about 30 miles south
of Johannesburg, stayed away from
work to protest increased rents.
Throughout the day shops were looted,
and the homes of the new town councillors were petro-bombed. It marked
the beginning of the protests which still
continue.
At one point, people marching
peacefully by one of the town councillor's houses were greeted by gunshots, as the councillor began firing at
them. Riots broke out, and after two
days 70 people lay dead, including four
town councillors. Several other councillors heeded residents demands and
resigned their positions. In Soweto two
weeks later, five people were killed by
police in a similar "stay-away." And
in two seperate incidents that occured
on October 28th, the mayors of two
different black townships in the
Easters Transvaal had their houses attacked and burned down by angry
mobs of residents. Since late October
numerous town councils have resigned
en masse. Alister Sparks of the Rand
Daily Mail estimates that since the
stay-away of November 5th and 6th,
township unrest "has virtually wiped
out the system of black local
authorities,'' with only four of the 22
councils in the Transvaal province still
functioning.
The South African government is
reluctant to admit that the violence in
the townships has a decidely political
overtone, pref erring to blame it on
"outside agitators." Much of the
violence is directed specifically at the
institutional symbols of apartheid namely the government-backed ''puppet" leaders, their businesses, and
government buildings. In a recent incident the government administration
buildings in the large black township of
Queenstown were burned down by protesters in late April.
Even the Financial Mail, an influential
South Africa business
magazine, has written, ''Black councils
established under the BLA Act seem
doomed. Members are quitting their
posts in response to calls by activist
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groups."
As an alternative to the town councils, the major townships have elected
their own civic associations, which have
actively organized residents to fight the
rent increases and the policies of the
town councils. This struggle for democratic control of the communities has
been a major cause of urban unrest.
The new constitution represents a
different kind of assault on the black
majority. The constitution went hand
in hand with the propaganda stunt intended by the BLA act. In a pamphlet
entitled "Guidelines for a New Dispensation," the government's Department
of Constitutional
Planning
and
Development posed the question,
''Why are blacks not included in the
new dispensation?" The answer given
was: "Blacks already have their own
governments and administration as for
example, in KwaZulu (where Zulu
ministers tend to their own affairs), or
in Soweto, where new councils with extended powers are to be established.''
The new constitution provides for a
tricameral parliament with representation for colored and Indian people.
The parliament now consists of a white
House of Assembly (178 members), a
colored House of Representatives (85
members) and an Indian House of
Delegates (45 members).
Blacks had already been given a taste
of the kind of reform promised by the
new constitution. "The Black Local
Authorities,
Indian and Colored
parliaments are doomed to failure,"
predicted a member of the popularlybased Soweto Civic Association.
''They are unacceptable and don't
have the support of the people. I am
convinced that our experience with the
new councils is the indicator of things
to come under the new parliament. The
same lies, the same promises, and eventually worse hardships for us." A
multi-racial coalition led by the UDF
organized a nationwide boycott of
what they called the "sham elections."
The elections, held in August, were
boycotted by over 80 percent of the
eligible Indian and colored voters.
The timing of the new parliamentary
elections in late August and the beginnings of the major riots in the black
townships in early September is no coincidence.
It represents
both a
coalescence of opposition and an
agonizing climax of black frustration
and anger.
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Both the black, local authorities and
the new constitution must be understood in the context of the larger apartheid strategy. The BLAs evolved as
part of Botha's dream of a social,
economic and political ''constellation
of South Africa States.'' Within this
scheme, rural blacks would be left to
manage their own affairs in the form
of independent homelands. Urban
blacks would be represented by a national body based on the town councils. The bulk of South Africa would
be preserved for the whites.
Together with the new constitution,
the new reforms represent a refinement
of South Africa's overarching divideand-rule strategy. It is a strategy of
wholesale
cultural,
social and
economic destruction. Not only are Indians and coloreds set against the
blacks in the new constitutional dispensation, but non-whites have delivered a
resounding blow to this plan. They
have resisted imposed divisions and left
Pretoria haphazard and defensive in its
attempts to maintain the advantage.
The price for the struggle in the
townships has been high. Over 300
people have been killed since
September, all but one of them black,
and the vast majority the victims of
police bullets. And the death toll continues to climb.
State repression is also reflected in
the fact that over 1000 people had been
detained without trial by the end of
1984. And a new feature of state reaction has been the use of conscripted
troops of the South African Defense
Force (SADF) to quell urban unrest.
Beginning with the development of
7000 troops in black townships in late
October, the SADF had for the first
time in South African history been
brought in numerous times in past
months to back-up the beleagured and
overwhelmed SAP. The · use of the
SADF represent a major escalation of
the urban conflict and is also an indication of how threatened Pretoria feels
by the continuing level of protest.
An editorial appearing in the Cape
Times in late October argued,
"Pretoria
can theoretically
ring
EVERY urban township with steel, but
the basic causes of bitterness among
blacks, if not addressed will grow.
While Mr. Heunis, Dr. Viljoen and
their cabinet colleqgues [Ministers of
Constitutional Planning and Development, and of Cooperation
and
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Development
respectively]
fiddle
around on the periphery of the problem, producing the odd bit of relief
here and there, the basic causes of
black unrest are left untouched. They
include influx control, inferior education and services and, most important,
a new constitution which leaves blacks
in limbo. . . Some black leaders have
already branded [this] civil war."
The resistance by blacks and the
state response make a mockery of the
notion that reform is taking place in
South Africa. What Pretoria has confirmed by its actions in the townships is
the total failure of its ''new deal''
policies to appease the majority blacks'
struggle for a democratic, non-racial
society. The regime's heavy handed
reaction also legitimates the power of
its new opposition, which has put the
Botha government and its proxies on
the defensive. And this opposition, by
nearly all accounts, is only in the formative stage.

David L. Goodman is a free-lance
journalist based in Boston. He recently
returned from southern Africa, where
he was writing for In These Times and
The Nation.

The Resist Pledge System
The most important source of Resist's
income is monthly pledges. Pledges
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us
a minimum monthly income. In turn,
pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which
contains news of recent grants and
other Resist activities. So take the
plunge and become a Resist pledge!

Yes, I would like to pledge S
monthly to the work of Resist.
Name ___________

_

Address __________
City ___

State __

_
Zip ___

_
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As people are beginning to remember the tenth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War,they are
forgetting one of its victims, Vietnamese political activist David Truong. David, who was convicted of
espionage in 1978,has been imprisoned in Federal institutions since January 1982. The Nation (March 2,

1985) stated that "Truong's real crime was working for reconciliation between the United States and
Vietnam."
~

While the government has expended over $1,000,000 prosecuting David Truong and another
$150,000 imprisoning him for what several of his former prosecutors now admit was insignificant, that
same government is preparing to deport him after he is paroled in August 1986. In a letter to the Appeals

Board of the Federal Parole Commission in 1983requested immediate parole and voluntary departation
to France. [So far, the Justice Department has declined to even discuss this option.]
~

To fight these injustices and to support David's ongoing work and study,

THE VIETNAM TRIAL SUPPORT COMMITIEE APPEALS TO
YOU TO SUPPORT DAVID TRUONG'S CASE.
~

David, who is incarcerated at the Federal Institution at Petersburg, Virginia earns S.11 per hour, or S15 per
month, at his 35-hour a week clerical job. Just to stay in touch with the real world outside, David needs postage for

leners to his friends and colleagues, and money for books and about two dozen newspaper and magazine
subscriptions-his most essential necessity. $15 a month will buy no more than a few pieces of fruit, coffee, toilet
articles and everyday items at highly-inflated prison commissary prices.

THE VIETNAM TRIAL SUPPORT COMMITIEE
MUST RAISE $10,000
_,

$50 per month, or $600 per year, for David's personal expenses
~ $100 per month, or $1,200per year, for David's postage costs
~ $150 per month, or $1,800per year, for David's newspapers, magazines, and books
~ $7,000 for legal and other anticipated expenses for David's deportation case.

Please fill out the coupon below and make a generous contribution to the Vietnam '!rial Support
Committee. For those making a contribution of $50 or more you may make your check payable to the
Asia Resource Center to make the contribution tax-deductible.

The Vietnam Trial Support Committee • P.O. Box 53393 • Washington, D.C. 20009

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------D Yes, I would like to contribute

to the VNTSCto continue its support of David 1ruong. I would like to

contribute:

•
•
D
•

$500 • $100
$50 • $25
Other______
Please place me on the
VNTSCmailing list for
updates on David's case.

Name __________________________

_

Address

-------------------------City___________________________
State _______________

Mail to: Vietnam 1rial Support Committee-P.O.

Zip __________

_
_

Box 53393, Washington, D.C. 20009

------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Page Six

Resist Newsletter

May/June 1985

Chomsky
Continued from page Two
ours, namely "our raw materials," and
a conspiracy to prevent us from
"maintaining the disparity," which of
course, must be the fundamental element of our foreign policy.
Well, it is obvious that a country of
this sort is an enemy-that is, part of
"the monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" -and that we have to take
drastic measures to ensure that ''the
rot does not spread,'' which is the terminology constantly used by the planners. In fact, when one reads reports of
this kind or looks at the health and
education statistics-the
nutritional
level, land reform, and so on-one can
understand very well why American
hostility to Nicaragua has reached such
fanatic, and almost hysterical levels. It
follows from the geopolitical conception previously outlined.
The people who are committed to
these dangerous heresies such as using
their resources for their own purposes
or believing that the government is
committed to the welfare of its own
people and so on, may not be Soviet
clients to begin with and, in fact, quite
regularly they're not. In Latin
America, they are often members, to
begin with, of Bible study groups that
become self-help groups, church
organizations, peasant organizations,
and so on and so forth. But by the time
we get through with them, they will be
Soviet clients. The reason they will be
Soviet clients by the time we get
through with them is that they will
have nowhere else to turn for any
minimal form of protection against the
terror and violence that we regularly
unleash against them if they undertake
programs of the kind described.
And this is a net gain for American
policy. One thing you'll notice, if you
look over the years, is that the United
States quite consistently tries to create
enemies if a country does escape from
the American grip. What we want to
do is drive the country into being a
base for the Russians because that
justifies us in carrying out the violent
attacks which we must carry out, given
the geopolitical conception under
which we organize and control much of
the world. So that's what we do, and
then we "defend" ourselves. We
engage in self-defense against the Great
Satan or the Evil Empire or the
''monolithic and ruthless conspiracy.''
More generally, the Soviet Union
plays the same kind of game within its
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gradually the Grand Area would
unravel.
So, for example, when the Bishop
regime in Grenada began to take any
constructive moves, it was immediately
the target of enormous American
hostility, not because the little speck in
the Caribbean is any potential military
threat or any of that sort of business. It
is a threat in some other respects; if a
tiny, nothing-country with no natural
resources like this can begin to extricate itself from the system of misery
and oppression that we've helped to
impose, then others who have even
more resources might be tempted to do
likewise.
Well, we recognized that we had to
prevent the rot from spreading so we
had to support France in its effort to
reconquer its former colony, and we
did so. By the time the French had
given up, we were providing about 80
percent of the costs of the war and in
fact we came close to using nuclear
weapons towards the end, by 1954, in
Indochina.
There was a political settlement, the
Geneva Accords, in 1954, which the
United States bitterly opposed. We im-

narrower domains, and that explains a
good bit of the structure of the Cold
War, in fact.
Well, what has all of this meant for
Indochina and Central America? Let's
begin with Indochina.
Now remember I'm talking about
the real world, not the one in the PBS
television series and so on. In the real
world what happened was that, by
1948, the American State Department
recognized, explicitly, that Ho Chi
Minh was the sole significant leader of
Vietnamese nationalism, but that if
Vietnamese nationalism was successful, it could be a threat to the
Grand Area, and therefore something
had to be done about it. The threat was
not so much in Vietnam itself, which is
not terribly important for American
purposes (the freedom to rob in Vietnam is not all that significant); the fear
was that ''the rot would spread,''
namely the rot of successful social and
economic development. In a very poor
country which had suffered enormously under European colonialism, successful social and economic development could have a demonstration effect. Such development could be a
model for people elsewhere and could
lead them to try to duplicate it and

Continued on page Eight
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Chomsky
Continued from page Seven
mediately proceeded to undermine
them, installing in South Vietnam a
violent, terrorist regime, which, of
course, rejected (with our support) the
elections which were projected. Then,
the regime turned to a terrorist attack
against the population, particularly
against the anti-French Resistance,
which we called the Viet Cong, in
South Vietnam. The regime had killed
about 80,000 people (that means we
had killed, through our plans and
mercenaries) by the time John F. Kennedy took over in 1961. This assault
against the population, after several
years, did arouse resistance-such acts
have a way of doing that-and
by
1959, the anti-French Resistance
received authorization from the Communist leadership, after several years
and after tens of thousands of people
were murdered, to use violence in selfdefense. Then, the government, which
we had established, immediately began
to collapse because it had no popular
support, as the United States conceded.
By 1959, the Resistance began to
receive some support from the northern half of the country in retaliation
against the violence unleashed by the
American-organized
attack from
against the population of the southern
part of Vietnam. The government we
had installed to carry out this attack
and to block the political agreements
quickly began to collapse as soon as
resistance began. Then Kennedy had a
problem. It's important to realize how
he handled this. This is one of the dissimilarities between Vietnam and Central America to which I will return. In
1961 and 1962 Kennedy simply launched a war against South Vietnam. That
is, in 1961 and 1962, the American Air
Force began extensive bombing and
defoliation in South Vie.tnam, aimed
primarily against the rural areas where
85 percent of the population lived. This
was part of a program designed to
drive several million people to concentration camps, which we called "strategic hamlets,'' where they would be
surrounded by armed guards and barbed wire, "protected," as we put it,
from the guerrillas who, we conceded,
they were willingly supporting. That's
what we call "aggression" or "armed
attack" when some other country does
it. We call it "defense" when we do it.
This was when the "defense" of
South Vietnam escalated, with this at-
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tack in 1961 and 1962. But that again
failed. The resistance increased, and by
1965, the United States was compelled
to move to an outright land invasion of
South Vietnam, escalating that attack
again. We also at that time initiated the
bombing of North Vietnam, which, as
anticipated, brought North Vietnamese
troops to the South several months
later.
Throughout, however, the major
American attack was against South
Vietnam. When we began bombing
North Vietnam in February 1965, we
extended the bombing of South Vietnam which had already been going on
for several years. We extended the
bombing of South Vietnam to triple
the scale of the bombing of North Vietnam, and throughout, it was South
Vietnam that bore the main brunt of
the American war in Indochina. We
later extended the war to Cambodia
and Laos.
As far as the major aims were concerned, the American war was a
smashing success. For one thing, there
was a huge massacre. The first phase of
the war, the French war, probably left
about half a million dead. From 1954
to 1965 we succeeded in killing maybe
another 160,000 to 170,000 South Vietnamese, mostly peasants. The war,
from 1965 to 1975, left a death toll of
maybe in the neighborhood of 3
million people. There were also
perhaps a million dead in Cambodia
and Laos. So all together about 5
million people were killed, which is a
respectable achievement when you 're
trying to prevent any successful social
and economic development. Furthermore, there were millions and millions
of refugees created by the American
bombardment, which was quite extraordinarily savage, not to mention
the murderous ground operations.
The land was devastated. People
can't farm because of the destruction
and unexploded ordance. And this is
all a success. Vietnam is not going to be
a model of social and economic
development for anyone else. In fact, it
will be lucky to survive. The rot will
not spread. We also made sure of that
by our actions in the surrounding
areas, where we buttressed the
American positions.
The post-war American policy has
been designed to insure that it stays
that way. We follow a policy of what
some conservative business circles out
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of the United States call "bleeding
Vietnam.'' That is, a policy of imposing maximum suffering and harshness
in Vietnam in the hope of perpetuating
the suffering and insuring that only the
most harsh and brutal elements will
survive. Then you can use their brutality as a justification for having carried
out the initial attack. This is done constantly and quite magnificently in our
ideological system. We are now supporting Pol Pot forces; we concede this
incidentally. The State Department has
stated that our reason for supporting
the Democratic Kampuchea Coalition,
which is largely based on Khmer Rouge
forces, is because of its ''continuity''
with the Pol Pot regime, therefore we
support it indirectly through China or
through other means. This is part of
the "bleeding Vietnam." Also, of
course, we offer no aid, no reparations, though we certainly owe them.
We block aid from international institutions and we've succeeded in
blocking aid from other countries.
India tried to send, in 1977, 100 buffalo, a very small amount, to Vietnam
to try to replenish the buffalo herd that
was destroyed in the war. We tried to
block it by threatening to cancel Food
for Peace aid to India if they sent the
100 buffalo. Mennonites in the U.S.
tried to send pencils to Cambodia;
again the State Department tried to
block it. They also tried to send shovels
to Laos to dig up the unexploded ordance. Of course, we could do it easily
with heavy equipment, but that we are
plainly not going to do.
0

Recent Resist Grants
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, Midwest Region
(Chicago, IL) $600
Central American Refugee Defense
Fund (Boston, MA) $300
NY Women Against Rape (NY,NY)
$600
American Indian Environmental
Council (Albuquerque, NM) $600
Clergy and Laity Concerned (Eugene,
OR) $600
NH Women's Peace Center (Concord, NH) $250
Middle East Research Information
Project (MERIP) (NY, NY) $500
Black and Proud Elementary School
(Jackson, MS) $250
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